A Socialist Compass for Aotearoa by Webb, Danielle
In this article, I argue that both tino rangatiratanga and socialism lie at the heart of emancipatory politics 
in Aotearoa New Zealand. For Māori, the economy 
has always been a dynamic site of interaction with 
the state and corporate bodies, and today the Māori 
economy is celebrated by some as a space where tino 
rangatiratanga can be realised. For the most part, 
though, the capitalist economy has been a site of 
exploitation for Māori. Given the inextricable relations 
between capitalism and colonialism, I present the case 
for Māori socialism as an emancipatory response to 
both. To do so, I employ Erik Olin Wright’s socialist 
compass, a conceptual tool that points to a variety of 
economic pathways towards socialism. But there is a 
major problem with Wright’s compass: it only has three 
points (state power, economic power, and social power). 
I extend Wright’s vision for socialism by completing 
the compass, adding to it a much needed fourth 
point: tino rangatiratanga. The resulting ‘Aotearoa 
socialist compass’ can be used to orient us towards 
Māori socialism—a socialist economy in which tino 
rangatiratanga is realised.
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The assertion of tino rangatiratanga, whether in resistance to, or 
in collaboration with, the state, has achieved much in political, 
cultural, and economic spheres.1 It was through diplomacy, 
determination, and persistence that rangatira first secured 
seats in Parliament and Māori representation in both central 
and local government. Culturally, the ‘Māori renaissance’ 
of the 1970s and 1980s led to renewed efforts in the revival 
of te reo Māori, the establishment of Kohanga Reo, and the 
celebration of Māori identity through the arts and media. In 
the economic sphere, which is the focus of this article, Treaty 
settlements and Māori innovation have led to the growth 
of the Māori economy, now worth around $50 billion.2 
1  I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their 
helpful suggestions. I would also like to thank Dylan Taylor and Jack 
Foster for encouraging me to develop this article and for patiently 
guiding me through the process.
2  Here, the ‘Māori economy’ refers to a range of corporations, 
businesses, and employers that self-identify as Māori and are included 
in official New Zealand economic statistics. See New Zealand Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, ‘The Māori Economy,’ https://www.mfat.govt.
nz/assets/FTAs-in-negotiations/UK-FTA/The-Maori-Economy_2.
pdf. It must be recognised that the definition of the Māori economy 
espoused in this report, and reflected in this article, is only one way of 
understanding the Māori economy. The same term might also be used 
to refer to traditional and diverse economic practices such as koha and 
manākitanga and reciprocal gift-giving, which were dominant prior to 
colonisation and continue to exist today.
DANIELLE WEBB
 
A Socialist Compass for Aotearoa: 
Envisioning Māori Socialism 
|
| COUNTERFUTURES 874 
Despite this progress, however, the devastating legacy of colonisation 
remains manifest in the lives of far too many Māori whānau today. 
According to the economist Brian Easton, by the 1970s Māori had become 
‘an indicator of what was happening to people who were lowest in the 
income distribution’.3 Inequality has only increased since the 1970s and 
Māori continue to rank among the lowest in income distribution and 
poverty measures today. 
One way Māori inequality has been measured has been by looking at 
the number of Māori, compared to non-Māori, who are represented in 
the precariat. The precariat, as conceptualised by Guy Standing, refers to a 
‘class in the making’, emerging in the wake of neoliberal economic reform 
and characterised by job insecurity.4 In many countries, including Aotearoa 
New Zealand, the neoliberal ideal of increased labour market flexibility 
has only transferred insecurity and risk from employers to employees. In 
the recently published book Precarity: Uncertain, Insecure and Unequal 
Lives in Aotearoa New Zealand, the precariat refers specifically to those 
who are in temporary work, are unemployed, or are receiving a benefit.5 
Using statistics from the 2014 New Zealand General Social Survey as well 
as their own research, the authors tell the stories of hundreds of young 
people, refugees and non-European immigrants, elderly, and many others 
who make up Aotearoa New Zealand’s precariat. Although they come 
from diverse backgrounds, the lives of all of these people are characterised 
by ‘situations and experiences of uncertainty, dependency, powerlessness, 
perilousness and insufficiency’.6 
While Precarity highlights the diversity of inequality, special attention 
is paid to the overrepresentation of Māori in the precariat: almost one in 
3  Brian Easton, ‘Māori have been trapped in a poverty cycle,’ E-Tangata, 13 May 
2018, https://e-tangata.co.nz/korero/brian-easton-maori-have-been-trapped-in-a-
poverty-cycle/
4  Guy Standing, The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class (London: Bloomsbury, 
2014), xii.
5  Shiloh Groot et al. eds. Precarity: Uncertain, Insecure and Unequal Lives in 
Aotearoa New Zealand (Auckland: Massey University Press, 2017).
6  Groot et al. Precarity, 13. 
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four Māori are represented in the precariat compared to almost one in six 
non-Māori.7 When comparing Māori and Pākehā deprivation they find 
that 13 percent of Māori are in temporary work compared to 8.2 percent 
of Pākehā; similarly, 12.4 percent of Māori are unemployed compared to 
4.4 percent of Pākehā.8 In comparing Māori to Pākehā (as opposed to all 
non-Maori, as in the first instance), the authors highlight the importance of 
viewing Māori inequality within the context of colonisation, pointing out 
that precarity is compounded by experiences of discrimination and cultural 
isolation. They urge the reader to remember the ‘deeds from this country’s 
past’, linking current Māori inequality with the historic appropriation of 
Māori land and natural resources.9 The key message is that Māori represent 
more than just a subset of the wider Aotearoa New Zealand precariat; 
underlying Māori inequality are issues of colonisation which, if not 
addressed, will continue to impinge on Māori wellbeing. 
Given the complexity of the inequality faced by Māori today, it is clear 
that emancipatory politics in Aotearoa New Zealand must address both 
colonisation and capitalist exploitation. The concept of Māori socialism, 
worked through in this article, addresses the need for both tino rangatiratanga 
and socialism. In section one, I demonstrate the need for Māori socialism 
by contextualising Māori inequality within the history of colonisation 
and capitalist exploitation. I then move on to give a brief overview of the 
different ways Māori authorities and the state have responded to this. In 
section two, I unpack Erik Olin Wright’s pragmatic approach to socialism 
as an achievable alternative to capitalism and introduce his concept of the 
socialist compass. In section three, I complete Wright’s compass by adding 
a fourth point: tino rangatiratanga. I develop the idea of Māori socialism 
by extending Wright’s vision to include the emancipatory goals of Māori 
in line with the vision for tino rangatiratanga outlined in the Matike Mai 
7  Groot et al. Precarity, 116. 
8  Groot et al. Precarity, 117. 
9  Groot et al. Precarity, 111.
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report.10 In the final section, with the new compass in hand, I explore the 
potential of the Māori economy and briefly outline some of the possible 
pathways towards Māori socialism. 
The historical roots of Māori inequality
Prior to European settlement most hapū were resource rich and had well-
established trading systems.11 While not entirely without hierarchy, the 
social structure of hapū was relatively flat and a strong culture of reciprocity 
and manaakitanga meant that wealth was evenly distributed. When 
Europeans did arrive many hapū were quick to adapt to the capitalist 
market economy. The 1840s and 1850s saw a thriving Māori economy 
characterised by hapū-driven enterprise and economic expansion.12 Many 
hapū, for example, became successful players in the coastal shipping, 
flourmilling, and farming industries. However, ‘the golden age of Māori 
enterprise’ was short lived; with the rapid increase of the Pākehā population 
came a demand for productive land and the subsequent dispossession of 
Māori from their main source of economic and cultural prosperity.13 The 
confiscation of Māori land during and after the Land Wars ‘led directly to 
the creation of “an almost landless proletariat”’.14 The proletarianisation 
of Māori left many dependent on the emerging Pākehā economy for wage 
10  He Whakaaro Here Whakaumu mō Aotearoa: The Report of Matike Mai Aotearoa – 
The Independent Working Group on Constitutional Transformation (2016), available at, 
https://nwo.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/MatikeMaiAotearoa25Jan16.pdf
11  For an overview of pre-European Māori societies, including their economic 
activity, see Atholl Anderson, ‘Emerging Societies: AD 1500–1800,’ in Tangata 
Whenua: A History, eds. Atholl Anderson, Judith Binney, and Aroha Harris 
(Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2014), 86–114.
12  Hazel Petrie, Chiefs of Industry: Māori Tribal Enterprises in Early Colonial New 
Zealand (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2006); Ranginui Walker, Ka Whawhai 
Tonu Matou: Struggle Without End (Auckland: Penguin Books, 2004).
13  Petrie, Chiefs of Industry, 5. 
14  Judith Binney, Vincent O’Malley, and Alan Ward, ‘Wars and Survival: 1860–
1872,’ in Tangata Whenua, 251. 
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labour in areas such as farming, gum digging, bush felling, and road making. 
Land alienation has arguably been the biggest contributor to Māori poverty; 
alienation continues today in various ways such as the Crown’s claim on the 
foreshore and seabed and the proposed housing development at Ihumātao. 
After the Second World War the ‘long boom’ drew the majority of 
the Māori population to the cities in search of employment and better 
standards of living.15 The Department of Maori Affairs actively encouraged 
this, relocating 399 families and assisting a further 485 to move ‘of their 
own accord’ in the early 1960s.16 Leaving the relative security of the kainga 
behind, urbanisation meant that whānau became even more dependent 
on wage labour. While the welfare state provided almost full employment, 
Māori were largely excluded from professional and managerial positions. 
Instead, as Evan Poata-Smith points out, Māori were offered precarious 
blue-collar jobs and treated as expendable in times of economic recession.17
The economic crisis of the 1970s had a disproportionately negative 
impact on Māori employment. As Aroha Harris and Melissa Williams 
explain, ‘Because Māori workers were concentrated in particular 
workplaces, often intergenerationally, economic downturns affected whole 
communities, not just individual families’.18 The impact of the economic 
crisis was exacerbated by the punitive labour and welfare reforms introduced 
by the fourth Labour government in 1984 and continued by successive 
15  In Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou, 96–97, Walker notes that urbanisation was swift. 
Before the war, 90 percent of the Māori population lived rurally, but by the 1960s 70 
percent had moved to the urban centres.
16  Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou, 198. 
17  Evan Poata-Smith, ‘The Political Economy of Inequality Between Maori and 
Pakeha,’ in The Political Economy of New Zealand, eds. Chris Rudd and Brian Roper 
(Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), 160–179. Poata-Smith emphasises the 
structural mechanisms of capitalism underlying Māori inequality. He identifies two 
major phases of proletarianisation: land alienation in the 1800s and urbanisation in 
the mid-1900s. 
18  Aroha Harris and Melissa Williams, ‘Rights and Revitalisation: 1970–1990,’ in 
Tangata Whenua, 365.
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governments since.19 While unemployment increased urban Māori poverty 
in the 1970s, it was the neoliberal policies in the 1990s that entrenched it. 
Two of the defining features of neoliberalism have been labour 
market deregulation and welfare cuts. As Jane Kelsey notes, while the 
fourth Labour government was quick to deregulate the market through 
trade liberalisation, its commitment to the trade union movement made 
it difficult to deregulate the labour market.20 It wasn’t until the National 
party came into power in 1990 that substantial changes to the labour 
market were made. The Employment Contracts Act 1991 (ECA) had a 
massive impact on employment security. The main goals of the ECA were 
to weaken the collective bargaining capacity of unions and to drive wages 
down. This meant that workers had little choice but to accept lower wages 
or face unemployment. To make matters worse, those who did lose their jobs 
could no longer rely on the welfare state to provide short-term relief—under 
National benefits were substantially reduced, and universal benefit subsidies 
were abolished or became means tested. Between 1989 and 1992 the number 
of people living below the poverty line increased by 35%. Māori were among 
those most severely impacted by these economic policies. 
While the introduction of neoliberalism was a devastating blow for 
working-class Māori, the 1980s saw the beginning of substantial economic 
gains at an iwi level. In 1985 the jurisdiction of the Waitangi Tribunal, 
which had been established in 1975, was extended to hear historic 
claims dating back to the 1840s. Since 1990, 75 iwi have finalised Treaty 
settlements and now have an asset base worth $9 billion.21 Much as during 
‘the golden age of Māori enterprise’ in the 1840s and 1850s, many of these 
iwi have invested wisely, making the most of a neoliberal economy and 
international trade. 
19  Evan Poata-Smith, ‘Inequality and Māori,’ in Inequality: A New Zealand Crisis, 
ed. Max Rashbrooke (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2013), 148–158.
20  Jane Kelsey, The New Zealand Experiment: A World Model for Structural 
Adjustment? (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995).
21  TDB Advisory, ‘Iwi Investment Report 2018,’ https://investmentnews.co.nz/wp-
content/uploads/iwi18.pdf. This report details the investment portfolios of the eight 
most successful iwi. 
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While the economic success of post-settlement iwi has been hard 
earned, it is not necessarily shared by all who suffer the consequences of 
colonisation. Poata-Smith draws attention to the growth of inequality 
within Māori communities, noting that dominant ideas about Māori 
development empower some groups of Māori, but disenfranchise and 
marginalise others.22 Just this year workers at Moana New Zealand, the 
country’s biggest iwi-owned fishing company, went on strike over low 
wages. These workers expressed their frustration at a company that makes 
millions of dollars a year but does not value its workers enough to pay the 
living wage. Despite economic success at an iwi level, then, many Māori 
continue to be overrepresented in measures of income and job insecurity. 
Tino rangatiratanga and the state
State policies concerning Māori have at different times coincided 
or conflicted with Māori aspirations for tino rangatiratanga. Tino 
rangatiratanga, as promised in the Treaty, refers to the right of hapū to 
practice self-determination.23 Iwi and hapū actively, and often forcefully, 
resisted Pākehā appropriation of land and political power. The Land 
Wars, in which various iwi and hapū united against British troops, began 
after the forced survey of land in Taranaki.24 Other forms of pan-tribal 
organised resistance included the Kingitanga and Kotahitanga movements, 
established in the 1850s. These movements represented a united effort of 
iwi and hapū in the assertion of tino rangatiratanga as a response to Crown 
breaches of the Treaty.25 While there are also examples of iwi and hapū who 
fought alongside the British, they did so with the understanding that Māori 
political and economic aspirations would be met by the newly established 
22  Poata-Smith, ‘Inequality and Māori.’ 
23  Margaret Mutu, ‘Constitutional Intentions: The Treaty of Waitangi Texts,’ 
in Weeping Waters: The Treaty of Waitangi and Constitutional Change, eds. Malcolm 
Mulholland and Veronica Tawhai (Wellington: Huia Publishers, 2010), 16–33.
24  Binney et al., ‘Wars and Survival: 1860–1872,’ 228.
25  Richard Hill, State Authority, Indigenous Autonomy: Crown-Māori Relations in 
New Zealand/Aotearoa 1900–1950 (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2004). 
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Pākehā government.26 However, as land alienation continued unabated 
into the 20th century, growing poverty and a decreasing population left 
Māori with little choice but to make compromises with the state in regards 
to tino rangatiratanga. 
The first half of the 20th century saw a closer relationship between 
Māori leaders and the state. The Labour–Ratana alliance in the 1930s, for 
example, promoted cooperation and reciprocity in Crown–Māori relations. 
In 1935 Prime Minister Michael Joseph Savage promised to advance Māori 
welfare in return for Māori support for Labour.27 Other attempts at state-
sanctioned Māori advancement sought to deal with rural Māori poverty 
through land development. Led by Āpirana Ngata, the Young Māori Party 
encouraged rural iwi to ‘combine the technological, cultural and other benefits 
of European civilisation with preserving “the best” of Maori culture’.28 
Indeed, the preservation of culture became a major focus for the 
advancement of tino rangatiratanga in the mid-20th century. The Māori 
Women’s Welfare League and the New Zealand Māori Council, both 
of which were supported by the state, worked hard to maintain cultural 
solidarity as Māori urbanised. Both the league and the council were integral 
in the establishment of the cultural clubs and urban marae which served 
the cultural needs of Māori at a time when government policy pushed for 
full assimilation.29 In 1961 the government had released the Hunn report, 
which detailed the plight of Māori in health, education, housing, and land 
development. As a solution to issues of Māori poverty, the report advised 
that Māori be fully ‘integrated’ under mainstream social welfare policy. 
In reality, the Hunn report represented the thinly veiled racism of the 
government’s assimilationist agenda. The idea that New Zealand had ‘the 
best race relations in the world’ had little to do with the state’s attempt 
at integration and was based largely on the efforts of Māori leaders who 
26  Hill, State Authority, Indigenous Autonomy. 
27  Walker, Ka Whawahi Tonu Matou. 
28  Hill, State Authority, Indigenous Autonomy, 44. 
29  Harris and Williams, ‘Māori Affairs: 1945–1970,’ in Tangata Whenua, 333–357; 
‘Rights and Revitalisation: 1970–1990’; Harris, Hīkoi: Forty Years of Māori Protest 
(Wellington: Huia Publishers, 2004). 
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mediated between the state and working Māori.30
Crown–Māori relations took a dramatic turn in the 1960s and 1970s 
with the resurgence of Māori political consciousness and protest. While 
the struggle against the colonial practices of land alienation and cultural 
assimilation had never been abandoned, resistance to state oppression was 
reinvigorated by the global protest and civil rights movements of the late-
1960s. The Māori Women’s Welfare League and the Māori Council had 
resisted cultural assimilation by ‘working in quiet ways to support’ their 
people without causing too much of a stir.31 A more assertive approach was 
adopted by young Māori activist groups like Ngā Tamatoa, who espoused 
contemporary methods of resistance such as marches, occupations, and 
pickets.32 These groups were predominantly made up of young, university 
educated, and left-leaning Māori who recognised the racism underlying the 
states assimilationist agenda. According to Harris, it was the land occupations 
(Bastion Point, Raglan, and Pākaitore), the 1975 Land March, and annual 
Waitangi Day protests of the 1970s that eventually led the government to 
give greater consideration to its obligations under the Treaty.33
In response to Māori activism, the fourth Labour government sought 
to appease Māori aspirations for tino rangatiratanga. Poata-Smith explains 
that this was achieved in two main ways: first, by allowing the Waitangi 
Tribunal to process historic claims, allowing for economic compensation for 
breaches of the Treaty; and second, by embracing biculturalism, allowing 
for  greater Māori representation in Parliament and the adoption of Māori 
models of organisation in the public sector.34 As Poata-Smith  points 
out, the opening of the Waitangi Tribunal to historic claims coincided 
30  Harris, Hīkoi, 20. 
31 Melissa Williams, Panguru and the City: Kāinga Tahi, Kāinga Rua: An Urban 
Migration History (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2014), 118. 
32  Harris, Hīkoi. 
33  Harris, Hīkoi.
34  Evan Poata-Smith, ‘He Pokeke Uenuku i Tu Ai: The Evolution of Contemporary 
Maori protest,’ in Nga Patai: Racism and Ethnic Relations in Aotearoa New Zealand, 
eds. Paul Spoonley, David Pearson, and Cluny Macpherson (Palmerston North: 
Dunmore Press, 1996), 97–116. 
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with the rise of ‘Maori cultural nationalism’.35 The main focus of cultural 
nationalism was the revitalisation of Māori culture, and activists at this 
time can be credited with the inclusion of language and cultural programs 
in the education system and the establishment of Kura Kaupapa and Whare 
Wānanga.36 While this achieved much for Māori in terms of cultural revival, 
it distracted activists who had previously challenged capitalism from the 
economic determinants of inequality. Similarly, the focus on biculturalism 
in Parliament has been criticised as a token gesture towards the inclusion 
of Māori culture that has done nothing to alleviate the poverty created by 
neoliberal policies.37 In this way, biculturalism can be seen as another form 
of assimilation: Māori have been allowed to celebrate culture as long as we 
conform to the capitalist agenda of the state.
Since the signing of Te Tiriti, Māori have consistently asserted tino 
rangatiratanga and much has been achieved politically, culturally, and 
economically. However, a huge number of Māori continue to live lives 
marked by insecurity and hardship. As Poata-Smith points out, many 
iwi leaders have turned to neoliberal economic policy in the interests of 
advancing tino rangatiratanga:
While many still look to constitutional change to reform the worst excesses 
of the system, a number of powerful tribal executives and corporate 
warriors have argued . . . that the welfare system has held Māori back and 
that real self-determination and liberation for Māori can only be achieved 
under unrestrained, free-market capitalism.38 
Like Poata-Smith, I disagree with this sentiment. Participation in the 
capitalist economy does not challenge the neoliberal policies that keep 
Māori poor; Māori liberation cannot be achieved under capitalism as we 
know it.  
35  Poata-Smith, ‘He Pokeke Uenuku i Tu Ai,’ 106. 
36  Poata-Smith, ‘He Pokeke Uenuku i Tu Ai’; Harris, Hīkoi.
37  Poata-Smith, ‘He Pokeke Uenuku i Tu Ai’; Harris and Williams, ‘Māori Affairs: 
1945–1970’; ‘Rights and Revitalisation: 1970–1990’. 
38  Poata-Smith, ‘He Pokeke Uenuku i Tu Ai,’ 98. 
83
Faced with the issue of Māori poverty, it is necessary to consider 
emancipatory alternatives to capitalism that remain sensitive to issues of 
colonisation. Socialism, in its various configurations, has long been seen 
on the Left as a plausible alternative to capitalism. While Māori socialist 
activism has decreased significantly since the 1970s and 1980s, it has not 
disappeared; Māori aspirations for socialism are still alive and well today. 
While there is no cohesive Māori socialist movement, there are a variety 
of groups and organisations that prioritise people and the environment 
over profit and who advance the case for tino rangatiratanga. Perhaps the 
most noteworthy example today is Save Our Unique Landscape (SOUL), 
a collective who are campaigning for the land at Ihumātao to be returned 
to mana whenua.39
Given the complexity of socio-economic inequality, our history 
of colonisation, and the diversity of Left politics, socialism must not be 
posited as a monolithic economic alternative to capitalism. What is needed 
on the Left is a variety of socially empowered pathways that provide people 
with more control over and within the economy so that we can eventually 
to transform it. 
The socialist compass
In Envisioning Real Utopias, Erik Olin Wright offers an inclusive and broad 
vision for socialism, based on social empowerment.40 In working through 
proposals for a ‘radical democratic egalitarian alternative to capitalism’, he 
argues that there is no single path towards socialism; rather, multiple paths 
may be pursued as long as they are oriented towards social empowerment.41 
Given the ‘empirical variability’ of economic systems, there is no such 
39  While they are not a self-proclaimed socialist group, their values (kotahitanga, 
manaakitanga, aroha, kaitiakitanga, rangimarie, and whakapono), goals, and actions 
are compatible with a socialist agenda. To support this kaupapa, and for more 
information, see their website: https://www.protectihumatao.com/
40  Erik Olin Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias (London: Verso, 2010). 
41  Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 110. 
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thing as pure socialism or pure capitalism.42 Instead, economic systems are 
hybrid in nature and differ depending on how power is organised.43 Wright 
develops a socialist compass with three points: state power, economic 
power, and social power. These points are used to navigate the pathways 
towards socialism. Before developing the socialist compass, Wright 
defines the conceptual vocabulary on which it is based. His definitions of 
power, ownership, the state, the economy, and civil society are vital to an 
understanding of the compass. I summarise them below. 
Power is broadly defined as ‘the capacity of actors to accomplish things 
in the world’.44 The capacity to act depends both on the ownership of 
resources and the socio-structural conditions under which actions take 
place. Under capitalism, for example, the owner of a factory is empowered 
both by the economic structure which alienates workers from the means of 
production and by the state which enforces contracts and protects property 
rights. Wright argues that power does not always require domination. For 
example, a group of people, acting together cooperatively, has the capacity 
to accomplish tasks without coercion. Power therefore takes different forms 
depending on the social relations on which it is based. Wright identifies 
three types of power: state, economic, and social, which derive from the 
state, the economy, and civil society respectively.
Wright’s definition of ownership is a little more complex and involves 
three dimensions. First, the agents of ownership: people who hold ownership 
rights. These can be individuals, organisations, families, the state, or even 
abstract entities such as society.45 Second, the objects of ownership: the 
things which can or cannot be owned. Third, the rights of ownership: the 
right to use things in different ways, the right to destroy things, and the 
right to sell, lend, or give things away.
While acknowledging the conceptual difficulties involved in defining 
ambiguous terms such as state, economy, and civil society, Wright keeps 
42  Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 111. 
43  Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 123. 
44  Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 111. 
45  Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 113. 
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his definitions relatively simple. The state is ‘the cluster of institutions, 
more or less coherently organized, which imposes binding rules and 
regulations over a territory’.46 The economy is ‘the sphere of social activity 
in which people interact to produce and distribute goods and services’.47 In 
capitalism this involves capitalist firms and market exchange. Finally, civil 
society is ‘the sphere of social interaction in which people voluntarily form 
associations of different sorts for various purposes’.48 Some associations are 
formal organisations such as churches, clubs, or labour unions, while others 
are looser associations of informal networks and communities. Based on 
these definitions, Wright constructs the conceptual points of his socialist 
compass: state power, economic power, and social power. 
Wright refers to state power as the state’s capacity to impose rules over 
a territory. He notes that while this includes its ability to exert force over its 
subjects, this is not always the dominant feature. For example, state power 
also relies on such things as ‘the ideological commitments of citizens to 
obey rules and commands’ and its effectiveness in solving social problems.49 
Economic power refers to the capacity of social actors to make use of and 
control the means of production and distribution. Social power is the 
capacity of associations in civil society to organise and act collectively on a 
voluntary basis. 
With these conceptual tools in hand, Wright provides a ‘typology 
of economic structures’, defining socialism in contrast to capitalism and 
statism.50 Unlike some socialist theorists, Wright does not view socialism 
as a ‘binary contrast to capitalism’ in which the state is privileged as a 
source of anti-capitalist power.51 Rather, socialism is separate from both 
capitalism and statism. Under capitalism, the means of production are 
privately owned by individuals or corporations and capitalist firms exercise 
46  Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 118. 
47  Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 119. 
48  Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 119.
49  Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 119.
50  Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 120.
51  Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 111. 
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economic power in the market economy. Statism is an economic system in 
which the means of production are owned and controlled by the state and 
in which economic activity is conducted through the exercise of state power. 
Socialism, then, is an economic system in which the means of production are 
collectively owned by various associations in civil society and is underpinned 
by social power. 
While Wright sets clear parameters around capitalism, statism, 
and socialism, he stresses that these are ideal types that do not exist in 
reality—they ‘live only in the fantasies (or nightmares) of theorists’.52 He 
emphasises instead the hybrid nature of economic systems. For example, 
while economic power dominates in most capitalist societies, the state 
usually plays a significant role in regulating the economy. Similarly, even 
authoritarian statist economies rely on informal social networks that lie 
outside of state power. Thus, capitalism, statism, and socialism are variables: 
The more the decisions made by actors exercising economic power 
determine the allocation and use of resources, the more capitalist is 
an economic structure. The more power exercised through the state 
determines the allocation and use of resources, the more the society is 
statist. The more power rooted in civil society determines such allocations 
and uses, the more the society is socialist.53
In emphasising the hybridity of the economy, the task becomes not so 
much to overthrow capitalism but to ground economic activity in social 
power and therefore orient ourselves towards socialism.
With state, economic, and social power as compass points, Wright is 
able to work through seven different scenarios of economic organisation—
different pathways to socialism. Each pathway links social power with 
economic activity. This is either direct, through social ownership of the 
means of production and social control over production, consumption, 
and the allocation of resources, or indirect, through various configurations 
of socially empowered state regulation or socially empowered forms of 
52  Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 123. 
53  Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 124. 
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state-free capitalism. There is no space to pursue all seven pathways here; 
instead, I briefly outline the four that I extend on in the next section.
Statist socialism refers to an economy where economic activity is 
controlled directly by a socially empowered state. The vision here is of 
a democratic state in which state power is subordinate to social power. 
Economic power is marginalised, meaning that ‘it is not by virtue of the 
direct economic ownership and control over assets that people have power to 
organize production; it is by virtue of their collective political organization 
in civil society and their exercise of state power’.54 Wright gives the example 
of associational councils or parties that draw on social power to influence 
state institutions.55 
Social democratic statist economic regulation also involves a socially 
empowered state acting on the economy. The difference here is that 
instead of acting directly on the economy, the state serves as a regulator 
of economic power (the power held by owners of capital). The state would 
intervene in the labour market by upholding such things as workers’ rights, 
pollution control, and product safety standards. Unlike statist socialism, 
all three forms of power inform the economy. This vision includes the 
possibility of private ownership; however, both state and economic power 
are subordinate to social power.56 
Social capitalism is where state power is marginalised and social power 
acts directly on economic power to shape the economy. Wright gives the 
example of labour unions who draw on their capacity to organise workers to 
influence economic power through collective bargaining. He acknowledges 
54  Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 131.
55  Wright notes that statist socialism lies at the heart of traditional Marxist 
revolutionary socialism but has remained largely theoretical. In practice, statist 
socialism has tended to end up with a concentration of power in a single party. He 
calls this ‘authoritarian statism’ and differentiates it from statist socialism as described 
above. Wright argues that it is likely that the state will continue to play a major role 
in the provision of public goods such as healthcare and education; therefore, statist 
socialism (as described above) remains an important emancipatory pathway. The goal 
for socialists is to work to bring state institutions under the control of democratically 
empowered civil society. 
56  Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 134–136.
WEBB | SOCIALISM |
| COUNTERFUTURES 888 
that social power is still fairly limited in this situation and suggests the more 
radical alternative of worker representation on firms’ boards of directors. 
This would include the replacement of shareholder boards with ‘stakeholder 
boards’ giving workers a voice in decision making.57  
The social economy sees both state power and economic power 
marginalised. The social economy involves the direct ownership of the 
means of production by voluntary associations. Workers would have 
authority over the allocation of resources and control over production and 
distribution. In this scenario, work operates outside of the capitalist market. 
The purpose of work would be to meet the needs of the workers (and their 
dependents) rather than being oriented towards profit-maximisation. 
Wright gives the example of Wikipedia, which produces knowledge and 
distributes it for free. Wikipedia’s infrastructure is funded by donations 
from its supporters, meaning it can operate independently from state or 
economic power.58
While Wright acknowledges that none of these pathways provide 
sufficient challenges to capitalism by themselves, he argues that ‘substantial 
movement along all of them taken together would constitute a fundamental 
transformation of capitalism’s class relations and the structures of power 
and privilege rooted in them’.59 Thus, he offers a hopeful vision for 
socialism which does not require an all-or-nothing socialist revolution. 
However, Wright’s concept of socialism has been developed outside of the 
Aotearoa New Zealand context, meaning it is not sensitive to the issues 
of colonisation in this country. As such, the socialist compass must be 
extended and adapted so that it takes into account the structures of power 
unique to Aotearoa New Zealand.
57  Wright defines stakeholders as ‘all people whose lives are affected by the use of 
[the] means of production’: Envisioning Real Utopias, 177.
58  Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 140–143.
59  Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 114. 
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The Aotearoa Socialist Compass
Like Wright, I propose a socialist alternative to capitalism. It is not enough 
for Māori to have tino rangatiratanga in an economy that continues to 
exploit the most vulnerable. In imagining an emancipatory future for 
Māori, whose lives continue to be impacted by colonisation and poverty, 
I propose a socialist alternative to capitalism. Iwi, hapū, and urban Māori 
authorities might have a unique way of achieving this and notions of 
tino rangatiratanga are not the same as Wright’s idea of social power. In 
developing the Aotearoa New Zealand socialist compass, therefore, a 
working definition of tino rangatiratanga, as a form of power, is required. 
Tino rangatiratanga as power
One of the many manifestations of tino rangatiratanga has been the ongoing 
struggle for constitutional transformation based on Te Tiriti o Waitangi. 
When Māori signed Te Tiriti, they did so with the understanding that 
tino rangatiratanga ‘over their lands, their villages and all their treasured 
possessions’ would be recognised by the Crown.60 The Crown failed to 
uphold this agreement. Since 1840 Māori have persisted with the struggle 
to have the Crown recognise Te Tiriti and more recently to have it enshrined 
in constitutional law.61 This vision took a hopeful leap forward in 2010 
with the establishment of Matike Mai Aotearoa, the independent working 
group on constitutional transformation. In 2016 Matike Mai released a 
report documenting the conversations from 252 hui on constitutional 
transformation in Aotearoa New Zealand.62 
After establishing that constitutional transformation was the desire of 
the people, the report outlined what this might actually look like. Based on 
model two at the end of the report, governance in Aotearoa New Zealand 
could be undertaken within three independent ‘spheres of influence’: 
the kāwanatanga sphere, under the authority of the Crown; the tino 
60  Mutu, ‘Constitutional Intentions: The Treaty of Waitangi Texts,’ 23. 
61  Mutu, ‘Constitutional Intentions: The Treaty of Waitangi Texts,’ 23. 
62  He Whakaaro Here Whakaumu Mō Aotearoa.
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rangatiratanga sphere, under the authority of an assembly of iwi, hapū, and 
urban Māori authorities (henceforth referred to as IHU authorities); and 
the relational sphere, where the two would interact and negotiate.63 Based 
on the constitutional vision of Matike Mai, and specifically on model two 
in the report, I define tino rangatiratanga as a form of power derived from 
IHU authorities. Specifically, tino rangatiratanga is the capacity of IHU 
authorities to exercise authority over their territories and ‘all their treasured 
possessions’, as promised by Te Tiriti.
To make sense of tino rangatiratanga as power alongside the three 
forms elaborated by Wright, the social structures of IHU authorities must 
be differentiated from both civil society and the state. According to Wright, 
civil society refers to ‘the sphere of social interaction in which people 
voluntarily form associations of different sorts for various purposes’.64 
While people can choose whether or not they affiliate with their iwi or 
hapū, it is usually not seen as a voluntary association. Rather, iwi and hapū 
are social structures based on whakapapa and one belongs by birthright. 
While a person cannot simply choose to belong to any iwi or hapū, many 
people belong to more than one and there may be some level of choosing 
which to primarily associate with. 
IHU authorities are also not equivalent to Wright’s definition of the 
state (‘the cluster of institutions, more or less coherently organized, which 
imposes binding rules and regulations over a territory’).65 Despite never 
ceding sovereignty, IHU authorities are currently under the jurisdiction of 
the state.66 Prior to European arrival, there was no single governing body 
that incorporated all iwi and hapū. While there was relationship between 
various iwi and hapū, each exercised full authority over the stretches of 
63  He Whakaaro Here Whakaumu Mō Aotearoa, 9. 
64  Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 119. 
65  Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 118. 
66  There are, of course, countless examples of Māori communities rejecting state 
control and asserting tino rangatiratanga. Two current examples are the protectors 
of Ihumātao, who are occupying the land despite being served eviction notices, and 
Ngāti Kahu, who have banned the Endeavour replica from their shores on the grounds 
that they are the sole authority in their rohe. 
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land, waterways, and coastal areas that they worked.67 Similarly, the Matike 
Mai report does not envision a single governing body with jurisdiction 
over all iwi and hāpu. Instead, model two proposes ‘an assembly made up 
of Iwi, Hapū and other representation including Urban Māori Authorities’ 
to form the tino rangatiratanga sphere.68 They do not go into detail about 
who exactly would make up this assembly or if/how they would be elected. 
However, as democracy is emphasised as an important value throughout 
the report, it would seem safe to assume that some kind of democratic 
arrangement is envisaged.
The revival of the Māori economy
While tino rangatiratanga relates to self-determination, people interpret 
this in different ways. In documenting the rise of cultural nationalism, 
Poata-Smith points out that ‘agreement on the vision of tino rangatiratanga 
is far from unanimous. It can simultaneously be identified with Maori 
capitalism, Maori electoral power, cultural nationalism or revolutionary 
activity’.69 Indeed, one of the ways Māori measure tino rangatiratanga 
today is through the success of the Māori economy. According to a report 
released by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, the 
Māori economy is now valued at $50 billion.70 It is made up of corporate 
iwi entities such as Ngāi Tahu’s investment branch, Ngāi Tahu Capital, 
as well as small Māori businesses. In an interview with The Spinoff, Hēmi 
Rolleston, the sector manager for Callaghan Innovation’s Māori unit, spoke 
of the reason for the upsurge in Māori businesses: ‘Māori have a lineage of 
exploring, navigating, and entrepreneurship. Having tino rangatiratanga 
over your life and income is appealing too. Māori in business is a natural 
67  Anderson, ‘Emerging Societies: AD 1500–1800.’
68  He Whakaaro Here Whakaumu Mō Aotearoa, 104–105.
69  Poata-Smith, ‘He Pokeke Uenuku i Tu Ai,’ 98. 
70  Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, ‘Māori Economy 
Investment Guide’. 
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fit!’71 The capacity for Māori to achieve tino rangatiratanga through 
economic advancement (that is, by becoming less dependent on the state 
for income) is certainly something to be celebrated. However, as argued 
above, the same neoliberal policies which help the Māori economy to grow 
are trapping a large proportion of Māori in poverty. 
Anake Goodall, former chief executive of Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu, 
seeks a more empowering alternative to capitalism. He argues that post 
settlement, iwi have strayed from the guidance of traditional values: ‘While 
[iwi boards] do have distinctive indigenous icons, it often seems their 
traditional values—their true North Star—are unnecessarily left at the 
boardroom door as the price of entry’.72 He also notes that the success of 
the Māori economy exists in tension with intergenerational Māori poverty. 
Despite this, Goodall has hope that the Māori economy will be able to 
move beyond capitalism; he advocates ‘investments by Māori entities in 
alternative models, rooted in community, that might genuinely be described 
as being “of the people, by the people, for the people”’.73 He asks why 
today’s Māori enterprises have not engaged in economic activities such as 
bartering, crowdsourced funding, or credit unions. Perhaps the answer to 
his question can be found in Wright’s observation that there is an ‘absence 
of a comprehensive institutional design for a radical democratic egalitarian 
alternative to capitalism’.74 Perhaps the vision for tino rangatiratanga in 
the Māori economy needs to be paired with a socialist vision to achieve 
liberation for all Māori, not just the elite.  
71  Rebecca Stevenson, ‘Adding up the little things: How Callaghan’s Māori team 
is unearthing the next big Māori business,’ The Spinoff, 1 December 2017, https://
thespinoff.co.nz/business/01-12-2017/adding-up-the-little-things-how-callaghans-
maori-team-is-unearthing-the-next-big-maori-business/  
72  Anake Goodall, ‘Back to the Māori Future?’ in Inequality, 159. 
73  Goodall, ‘Back to the Māori Future?’ 162.
74  Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias, 110. 
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Māori socialism: Emancipatory pathways
In a similar fashion to Wright, I use the Aotearoa New Zealand socialist 
compass to point to pathways leading towards a socially and tino 
rangatiratanga empowered economy. The following pathways, adapted 
from the four outlined above, represent a theoretical vision for Māori 
socialism. It must be emphasised that this is not an exhaustive list of viable 
alternatives and that these pathways can exist alongside one another. The 
intention here is to demonstrate how the compass may be used to envision 
potential alternatives to the dominance of the capitalist economy. 
Iwi socialism (statist socialism)
This would require a socially empowered state (kāwanatanga sphere) and 
socially empowered IHU authorities (tino rangatiratanga sphere), both 
of which would have control over different parts of the economy. In this 
vision, economic power is marginalised, meaning capitalists would not 
have direct power over the economy. Instead, socially empowered (i.e. 
democratic) IHU authorities would have control over their means of 
production and the allocation of resources. The extent to which economic 
activity would be regulated by the assembly of IHU authorities and how 
much would be regulated by individual iwi and hapū themselves would be 
determined democratically. In this scenario, the kāwanatanga sphere would 
also operate democratically, with interaction between the two occurring in 
the relational sphere. For example, arrangements around trade regulations 
(both domestic and international) and currency would need to be agreed 
on. A discussion of the technical and political specifics of what this could 
look like is not possible here; the core point is that the Crown would have 
no jurisdiction over IHU authorities. 
Iwi economic regulation 
(social democratic statist economic regulation) 
This pathway also requires a socially empowered state and socially 
empowered IHU authorities. In this case, however, economic power 
WEBB | SOCIALISM |
| COUNTERFUTURES 894 
is included and acts on the economy. This scenario allows for private 
ownership. While traditionally the concept of private ownership was 
foreign to Māori, it is not the case now and this needs to be considered 
when contemplating emancipatory futures. However, in line with Wright’s 
vision for socialism, economic power would be subordinate to state power 
and/or tino rangatiratanga (depending on where individuals and firms are 
situated in respect to the kāwanatanga and tino rangatiratanga spheres). 
Thus, IHU authorities would be able to regulate (to some degree) the 
economic activity of individual economic players within their jurisdiction. 
Again, the Crown would have no jurisdiction over the tino rangatiratanga 
sphere and there would be interaction between the two. For example, 
laws regulating economic power so as to ensure the protection of workers 
and the environment might be agreed upon in the relational sphere. The 
core difference between this pathway and Wright’s equivalent is that 
instead of just the state regulating economic power there would also be an 
independent assembly of IHU authorities, which, in turn, would recognise 
the autonomy of individual IHU authorities. 
Tino rangatiratanga capitalism (social capitalism)
This pathway marginalises the role of the state. That is not to say there is 
no state; rather, it recognises that if firms and corporations have sufficient 
worker representation there will be no need for state regulation. This goes 
for both the kāwanatanga and the tino rangatiratanga spheres. In this 
scenario, Māori capitalist firms would be free to compete in the market. 
However, economic power would be informed by socially empowered 
individuals and groups. As with Wright’s description, this would include 
stakeholder boards in which all members of the IHU association have the 
right to have their voice heard. This vision is already realised in some areas 
of iwi corporatism. Anake Goodall, for example, notes that Māori land 
trusts and ownership structures combine ‘in single entities the interests 
of shareholders and stakeholders, citizens and investors and social agents, 
and—most fundamentally—close family members’.75 The key here 
75  Goodall, ‘Back to the Māori Future?’ 159–160. 
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would be to ensure stakeholder interests were prioritised and represented 
democratically. While Māori would certainly be free to directly influence 
economic power, there may be times when it is more appropriate for 
individuals to work through the structures of iwi and hapū. This scenario 
highlights the complexity of tino rangatiratanga and how it differs from 
state power and social power. Tino rangatiratanga can assume the role of 
both the state and civil associations but is not equal to either. 
The social economy 
This final scenario does not differ from Wright’s description for a social 
economy. Here it is recognised that not all Māori can, or indeed want 
to, affiliate with an IHU authority. This scenario recognises the diversity 
in Māori society and the extension of tino rangatiratanga to individuals; 
it makes space for Māori who wish to form associations outside of IHU 
authorities. As with Wright’s social economy, this pathway operates outside 
the capitalist market and does not require the state; instead, people are able 
to engage directly in economic activity. A local example is the Wellington 
Timebank where people swap knowledge and skills for credit which can 
then be traded for other services in the community.76 The concept of 
mahi aroha, the manifestation of love through work, is another example.77 
Mahi aroha is akin to volunteering one’s services. Underlying the concept, 
however, is the idea of reciprocity. People who engage in mahi aroha do 
so with the knowledge that they are contributing to a community that 
nurtures them in various ways. It is understood that one’s services might 
not be reciprocated immediately, indeed, it may not even happen in one’s 
lifetime (for example, caring for the environment for the benefit of your 
grandchildren). It must be noted that the social economy is not currently 
strong enough to ensure that whoever provides their services for free 
will receive sufficient reciprocation. Most people are at least somewhat 
76  For more information, see http://www.wellingtontimebank.org.nz/ 
77  See Office for the Community and Voluntary Sector, Mahi Aroha: Māori 
Perspectives on Volunteering and Cultural Obligations (Wellington: Office for the 
Community and Voluntary Sector, 2007). 
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dependent on the capitalist market and the social economy runs the risk of 
exploiting unpaid work in the same way that capitalism does. 
Pursuing institutional change along these (and other) emancipatory 
pathways would serve to undermine the dominant economic and state 
structures that currently keep Māori poor. IHU authorities, operating 
free from state power, would have the freedom to side-step the neoliberal 
policies that have been so detrimental to many Māori whānau. As Wright 
points out, substantial movement along all of these pathways would 
begin to transform economic institutions, making a radical, democratic, 
egalitarian, tino rangatiratanga alternative to capitalism possible. 
Conclusion
The overrepresentation of Māori in the precariat is an enduring feature of 
Aotearoa New Zealand society. Throughout history, Māori struggles for 
tino rangatiratanga have been diverse and at times contradictory, ranging 
from the Land Wars to Māori capitalism. In the early years of colonisation, 
tino rangatiratanga was manifest in direct and forceful opposition to the 
Pākehā state. By the early 1900s, however, many Māori leaders began to 
seek ways of working alongside the state to achieve economic and cultural 
aspirations. Since the 1980s one of the major ways tino rangatiratanga 
has been realised has been through the transfer of substantial economic 
power through Treaty settlements. Bringing claims before the Waitangi 
Tribunal has demanded much of rangatira both past and present, and the 
hard-earned fruits of this mahi should be celebrated. However, investment 
in a neoliberal capitalist economy has proven to be a shallow and limited 
emancipatory project where the Māori precariat are concerned.
Margaret Mutu, Moana Jackson, and all those involved in the Matike 
Mai project offer a more hopeful vision for Māori. They envision a future 
where tino rangatiratanga is taken seriously and the Crown can no longer 
assert state power over iwi, hapū, and urban Māori authorities. This vision 
is hopeful, achievable, and should lie at the heart of emancipatory Māori 
politics. I have argued that Māori socialism must be part of this vision 
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too. Unless tino rangatiratanga takes a socialist bent there is little hope 
that those represented in the precariat will ever be free from the poverty 
resulting from capitalist colonisation. This is a vision that all on the Left, 
Māori and non-Māori alike, can get behind. In developing the Aotearoa 
socialist compass, I have provided a conceptual framework with which we 
can orientate ourselves towards a socialist future where tino rangatiratanga 
is a reality.
More research is required to develop the concept of Māori socialism 
further. Each of the pathways above (as well as new ones) could be developed 
by looking into existing models, businesses, and economic practices 
(including those outside normative definitions of the economy). Another 
avenue worth exploring would be using empirical research to model what 
the Māori economy would look like under the Matike Mai kaupapa. Would 
it suffer, as other economies have, when a formally colonised state gains its 
independence? Would the Crown have an obligation under the Treaty to 
ensure the stability of the Māori economy? Would this separation spell 
economic disaster for both economies? 
That there is a need for radical economic and constitutional 
transformation in this country is beyond doubt. The obstacles to achieving 
such transformation can at times seem insurmountable. But this does not 
mean that we need limit our imaginations and political goals to what is 
achievable under the status quo. We do not have to have a fixed map of 
where we are going to know where we want to be, and we do not have 
to know all the possible roadblocks in advance. The Aotearoa socialist 
compass can be used to guide us in the right direction and to reorient 
ourselves when the unexpected happens.  
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